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THE EMERGENCE OF EQUALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
VALUE: THE FIRST CENTURY*
WILLIAM M. WIECEK**
Equality assumed its place as a core value of the American constitu-
tional order after World War Two-beginning in 1947 to 1949, to be pre-
cise. 1 As the ardor of the 1960s civil rights era cooled and subsided in the
face of frustration, skeptics challenged the idea that equality was a mean-
ingful substantive value, claiming that it has no normative content. They
insist that its foundational principle, treat likes alike, is a mere tautology.
2
Eminent jurisprudents disagree, 3 but equality as a value remains vulnerable
in a political climate hostile to its aspirations.4 Its meaning remains dis-
puted, disparaged, and even denied today.
At such a time, it is useful to recur to the origins of the equality norm
in our constitutional system. As a guide to its meaning today, we should
determine what it meant to those who placed it in the Constitution, and how
it developed, or, per contra, how it was at first stunted or ignored by those
charged with enforcing it. In this way we might at least recapture the vision
of those who prescribed its meaning. Otherwise, we risk losing sight of it in
abstract philosophical speculation. Equality does have a substantive con-
tent, historically defined. Moreover, that meaning is dynamic, not static,
* I draw on ideas that I first presented in The Civil War and Equality, given at the Library of
Congress symposium, The Civil War and American Memory (November 2002).
** LL.B. Harvard Law School; Ph.D. (History) University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1968. Cong-
don Professor of Public Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
1. I explore that development in WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN
CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 62 1ff (2006).
2. See, e.g., PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE
OF "EQUALITY" IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1997); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982). The aphorism "treat likes alike" originated with Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS 118-19 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
3. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Reciprocity, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 190, 190
(Samuel Freedman ed., 1999); JOHN RAWLS, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra at 254, 258; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 441-49 (rev. ed. 1999)
(positing equality as a function of liberty, justice, and access to social goods); Kent Greenawalt, "Pre-
scriptive Equality": Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1997).
4. On this vulnerability, see ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992). For a critique of equality, see, for example, ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 232-38 (1974) (arguing that efforts to bring about equality may not be done at the
expense of those claiming "entitlements").
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intended by its framers to evolve to meet changes in society; in the spirit of
John Marshall's McCulloch opinion, "a constitution [is] intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs." 5 I therefore propose to examine the origins and early (non-)
development of constitutional equality.
Let me begin by defining what I mean by "constitutional equality."
This phrase refers to a race-transcendent status before the law in which all
people are under the law's discipline and may claim the law's protection.
All individuals enjoy the same rights and opportunities as others, neither
enhanced nor diminished because of the racial designation imputed to
them. Such equality must be real and not merely formal or nominal. This
definition is simple and almost question begging, uncomplicated by phi-
losophical rumination, but it has the virtue that it is the value that those
who placed it in our Constitution intended.
At first glance it might seem perverse to someone not familiar with
America's constitutional traditions that we should even be questioning the
centrality of this value. Is not human equality one of the nation's oldest and
most deeply embedded public values? Was it not proclaimed by Jefferson's
assertion in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created
equal" and implicitly affirmed in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address? Did not
the United States Supreme Court consecrate it in the most important Su-
preme Court decision of the modem era, Brown v. Board of Education I?
No. In reality, interpersonal, race-transcendent equality as we think of
it at the turn of the twenty-first century was a value unknown to the Consti-
tution of 1787. Thus, the intentions of the framers of the original 1787
Constitution provide little guidance in parsing the meaning of equality. The
American people had to endow the unprecedented ideal of equality with
some prescriptive content in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They
did not do so at first, however; the idea was too contested, to say the least.
So faute de mieux, the Supreme Court assumed the leading institutional
role in imposing a meaning on the equality value. Its performance closely
tracked social evolution in the larger society: the Court validated racial
oppression until around 1905, but then began to construct a doctrinal basis
for the equal protection of minorities' rights thereafter.
The equality value was embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, so the doctrinal evolution of
that clause became the vehicle for giving meaning and content to equality.
By tracing the early history of the Clause, we will uncover the meaning of
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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equality to those who elevated it to constitutional status, beyond the power
of later Congresses to impugn.
I. EQUALITY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
Americans first considered the matter of equality in the political and
ideological milieu created by the American Revolution. 6 The notion of
equality was almost entirely unknown to the original Federal Constitution
(as well as to its predecessors, the Articles of Confederation and the
Northwest Ordinance). Oscar Handlin observed, with considerable under-
statement, that "equality entered only tangentially into the [Federal] Consti-
tution as ratified in 1789. This was not a subject that greatly concerned
either the framers of that document or the people who ratified it.'" 7 In only
one place did the original Federal Constitution explicitly guarantee equal-
ity, and that was in its assurance "that no State, without its Consent, shall
be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." 8 That was itself a striking
reminder of how alien the idea of interpersonal equality was at that time,
since the Senate's makeup guaranteed an extensive, permanent malappor-
tionment that was one of the many structural protections for slavery found
throughout that document.
Nor was the constitutional order of the states much different. To be
sure, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, a bellwether to many contempo-
rary and later state constitutions, did declare "[t]hat all men are by nature
equally free and independent," and then went on to assert the rights of life,
liberty, and property. 9 But that adverbial gesture to equality wilted instan-
taneously when exposed to the reality of slavery, and the Virginians felt
compelled to edit George Mason's draft by adding a phrase qualifying
"rights": "of which, when they enter into a state of society."' 10 In the dialec-
tic peculiar to slave societies, this code language was understood to exclude
slaves, native peoples, and others who did not-and by definition could
not-enter into the society of free white men who were at that moment
creating their political society. (Enslaved people were not members of a
society. They were in it but not of it.) When states northwards, like Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts, copied the Virginia model, they did not in-
clude the coded exclusion, but they did not adopt an equality principle
6. See generally GORDON S. WOOD & JR. POLE, SOCIAL RADICALISM AND THE IDEA OF
EQUALITY IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1976).
7. Oscar Handlin, The Quest for Equality, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 35, 35.
8. U.S. CONST. art. V.
9. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 1, reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 48, 49 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979).
10. I A. E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 62 (1974).
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either. I I Surveying this process, the late Willi Paul Adams concluded that
most of the new states "did not formally acknowledge the principle of
equality in their first constitutional documents in the years following Inde-
pendence."12
The framers of the eighteenth-century constitutions did aspire to po-
litical equality among men, as a function, or at least an inevitable conse-
quence, of the republican forms of government that they were creating.
"[T]hat constitution of civil government [is best] which admits equality in
the most extensive degree," wrote Sam Adams in 1771.13 But as J.R. Pole
concedes, such equality was "open to white people only."'1 4 That political
equality principle grew out of pre-1776 American claims for equality of
political status for themselves as subjects with those they considered their
fellow Englishmen who remained "at home" in the metropole. Even politi-
cal equality was circumscribed. The Massachusetts Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1780, in its Address of the Convention, explained to the people of
the commonwealth that political equality certainly did not mean one man,
one vote. Each town was given one vote in the lower house, "and to pre-
vent an advantage arising to the greater towns by their numbers," represen-
tation was mathematically diluted for places with larger populations. After
all, the delegates thought, "it cannot be understood thereby that each Town
in the Commonwealth shall have Weight and importance in a just propor-
tion to its Numbers and property."' 15
After Independence, the impulse toward equality at the social level di-
verted into a revulsion against aristocracy. Politics moved away from the
deferential nature of local polities that characterized pre-Revolutionary
regimes in the individual colonies' 6 toward a social ideal that extolled
equality of economic opportunity for all. Debates of the Revolutionary
11. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 92, 93 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975); PA. CONST.
of 1790, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
286, 292 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979).
12. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND
THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 176 (Rita Kimber & Robert
Kimber trans., 1980). See generally Stanley N. Katz, The Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Consti-
tutional Equality, 75 J. AM. HIST. 747 (1988).
13. Samuel Adams, Article Signed "Vindex," BOSTON GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 1771, reprinted in 2
THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 142, 152 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1906).
14. J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5 (rev. ed. 1993); see also id. at
1-66.
15. Address of the Convention, March 1780, in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 438 (Oscar Handlin &
Mary Handlin eds., 1966).
16. See CHARLES S. SYDNOR, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS: POLITICAL PRACTICES IN
WASHINGTON'S VIRGINIA (1952).
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years resounded with indignant denunciations of aristocracy and privilege,
which, in the American context after Independence, meant political power
not earned by merit through republican means. But the framers of the origi-
nal state constitutions had no intention of abolishing distinctions based on
merit. Republican equality was "adverse to every species of subordination
beside that which arises from the difference of capacity, disposition, and
virtue." 17 The resulting social hierarchies would produce "the necessary
subordination" that would offset "a certain degree of equality [that] is es-
sential to human bliss."'18 Inequality was innate in the human condition.
Americans understood that "nature has made them very unequal in respect
to their original powers, capacities, and talents."' 19 "Was there, or will there
ever be, a nation, whose individuals were all equal, in natural and acquired
qualities, in virtues, talents, and riches?" John Adams asked rhetorically.
He answered his own question: "The answer of all mankind must be in the
negative.... [N]o human legislator ever can eradicate" inequality.20 Even
if equality of condition could somehow be legislated, it would be undesir-
able: "[P]erfect equality ... deadens the motives of industry, and places
Demerit on a Footing with Virtue .... ,,21
The early state and federal constitutions did, to be sure, discounte-
nance inequality among persons, but that condemnation applied only to
what might be called "privileging inequality," the sort of inequality that
elevated a select few above the masses in rank or opportunity. 22 Thus, the
Federal Constitution twice banned titles of nobility,23 while the Virginia
Bill of Rights stipulated that "no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclu-
sive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in con-
sideration of public services .... "24 During the 1829 debates on revising
the 1776 constitution, a delegate to the Virginia Constitutional Convention
17. Democraticus, Loose Thoughts on Government (June 7, 1776), reprinted in 6 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 730, 730 (Peter Force ed., 1846).
18. Letter from Thomas L. Shippen to William Shippen, Jr. (Feb. 20, 1788), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 502, 504 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) (emphasis omitted).
19. JOEL BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE
RESULTING FROM THE NECESSITY AND PROPRIETY OF A GENERAL REVOLUTION IN THE PRINCIPLES OF
GOVERNMENT 17 (Cornell Univ. Press 1956) (1792), quoted in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 607 (1969).
20. 1 JOHN ADAMS, DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 272, 392 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
21. THOMAS DAWES, JR., ORATION DELIVERED JULY 4, 1787, at 10 (1787), quoted in WOOD,
supra note 19, at 495 (emphasis omitted).
22. See BERNARD BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION: PERSONALITIES AND THEMES IN THE
STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 102, 195-206, 220-21 (1990).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.
24. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 4, in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 9, at 49.
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interpreted the "equally free" provision to mean that "no one man is born
with a natural right to control any other man [slaves as usual being the
unspoken exception]; that no one man comes into the world with a mark on
him, to designate him as possessing superior rights to any other
man .... "25 Hence, the early hostility to monopolies and other forms of
special privilege that were a hobbyhorse among Jeffersonians. 26 From this
source flowed the peculiar antipathy to the Society of the Cincinnati: even
the earned privilege of veteran officers was suspect. Running through the
rhetoric and constitutional provisions of the Revolutionary epoch was a
palpable hostility to state actions that benefited political hustlers who had
no merit but only connections. This mind-set of the early Republic centered
on a negative vision of equality as the absence of special privilege, privi-
lege being defined as "[t]he unequal or partial distribution of public bene-
fits within a state"--precisely what the Virginia Bill of Rights forbade.27
In politics, however, the Framers anticipated an equality of rights for
all citizens: "They all feel that nature has made them equal in respect to
their rights ... [possessing] an equal right to liberty, to property, and to
safety .... -28 But such equality was only for all those who were members
of society-which, naturally, excluded enslaved persons. Even for enfran-
chised white males, such political equality as they came to enjoy was con-
tinuously destabilized by America's bedrock individualism, beckoning
opportunity, and incipient industrialization. The egalitarian impulse was
suspect, at least to elites, as leading to a dull conformity that would either
discourage the natural aristocracy the Framers anticipated or lead to the
Orwellian state of deadened uniformity that they dreaded.29
During the early years of the Republic, some inchoate egalitarian pro-
toprinciples did begin to marble the civic values that Americans cherished.
These included such things as aversion to class legislation (where one eco-
nomic group secured legislative favoritism over the rest of society in the
form of monopolies or other privileges) or attachment to procedural regu-
larity (so that no individual would be treated differently from any other
25. DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF THE
1820's, at 292 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1966).
26. See, for example, the views of Chief Judge Spencer Roane in Currie's Administrators v.
Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 345-56 (1809), and of the Jeffersonian polymath
THOMAS COOPER, LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 246 (2d ed. 1830) (viewing
corporations as "public nuisances"), quoted in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW 1836-1937, at 36 (1991).
27. Quoted from Pennsylvania debates of the period in WOOD, supra note 19, at 401.
28. BARLOW, supra note 19, at 17, quoted in Wood, supra note 19, at 607.
29. See Philip B. Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629, 682
(1970).
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similar person in the legislative or judicial process). These values eventu-
ally contributed to the ideal of equality as we know it today, and in their
early avatars gave the appearance (or illusion) that the United States was an
egalitarian society.
Jacksonian Democrats of the 1830s and '40s mined those early values
for their programs, which contemporaries and later enthusiasts hailed as
egalitarian. But equality as we understand it at the dawn of the twenty-first
century-interpersonal and transracial-was unknown to early American
law. The Revolutionary-era conception of equality sought only intragroup
equality; intergroup equality was inconceivable in 1780, at least when the
groups were racially defined.
There was also a religious dimension to Founding-era concepts of
equality. To accommodate the new nation's remarkable religious diversity,
Americans debated two models of equality. Philip Hamburger calls these
models "equal protection," a comparatively more lax standard favored by
religious establishments that would have tolerated extensive group privi-
leges, and "equal civil rights," a view cherished by dissenters that would
have enforced equality of privilege among groups defined by religious
affiliation. 30 But as he concedes, these debates did not touch the multiform
problems of equality among different racial groups.
To the extent (not much) that the Framers thought about universal per-
sonal equality at all, they considered it repugnant to the Constitution's au-
thentic values and a lethal threat to the new national union so precariously
established. Slavery was solidly ensconced in the constitutional order of
nearly all the states, and of the federal government as well. It had been an
essential component of the American legal order for over a century by the
time the Federal Constitution was drafted.31 Whether or not the Constitu-
tion was a pro-slavery compact, 32 it guaranteed the security of slavery in
30. See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About
Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295.
31. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1711 (1996).
32. Modem neo-Garrisonians believe that it was. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 1-33 (1996); William M. Wiecek, "The
Blessings of Liberty": Slavery in the American Constitutional Order, in SLAVERY AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES: THE CONSTITUTION, EQUALITY, AND RACE 23, 23-40 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman
eds., 1988); William M. Wiecek, The Witch at the Christening: Slavery and the Constitution's Origins,
in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167, 167-84 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis
J. Mahoney eds., 1987); Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the
Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423 (1999) (hereinafter Finkelman, Affirmative Action];
Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's
Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247. Don E. Fehrenbacher rejected the neo-Garrisonian view
in THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS
TO SLAVERY 3-47 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001).
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pervasive ways and thereby assured that black Americans would remain
legally degraded relative to whites. The Three-Fifths, Fugitive Slave, and
Slave Trade Clauses were the most visible tokens of that commitment, but
they were not the only ones. 33
Slavery was one element of a national civic identity derived from what
Rogers Smith terms "ascriptive citizenship" and "civic inequality. '34
Throughout our history, Americans have created a national community in
which access to political power and protection for personal liberty was
determined by race, gender, ethnicity, class, and religion.35 The master
narratives of Tocquevillian egalitarian democracy and communitarian civic
republicanism fail to recognize, much less incorporate, the reality of exclu-
sion and enforced inequality that result from such ascriptive citizenship.
In contrast to the privileging inequality that had been universally con-
demned in the Revolutionary era, few Americans were prepared to attack
the inequality of degradation that slavery represented. Aside from a handful
of egregious individuals like John Woolman and Anthony Benezet, no
Revolutionary-era American seriously proposed displacing slavery and
racism with an ideal of equality among all people. Instead, the liberal val-
ues that extolled individualism, self-seeking, competition, and a Hurstian
focus on the economy as the proper arena for realizing human creativity 36
promised that society would sort itself out into ranks spontaneously, natu-
rally, and justly, with distinctions based on merit alone. Race-based slavery
was at most a lamentable exception to that meritocracy, but inevitable, at
least in the short run.
Both Thomas Jefferson and, later, the Jacksonian Democrats pro-
claimed the goal of a more egalitarian society, but their visions were fatally
compromised by their racist hostility to black Americans. Jefferson's ideal
republic of yeoman farmers would have been possible only by the expul-
sion of all blacks, slave and free alike (which in fact he demanded), while
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Three-Fifths Clause); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (Fugi-
tive Slave Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I (Slave Trade Clause). Paul Finkelman finds eighteen
pro-slavery clauses in the original Constitution. See Finkelman, Affirmative Action, supra note 32, at
428-31. 1 found ten in WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-83 (1977).
34. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997).
35. On the gendered dimensions of this inequality, see LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT To BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998).
36. See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
[Vol 82:233
THE EMERGENCE OF EQUALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
Jacksonian equality, tiresomely extolled for so long, 37 was only for the
"Herrenvolk Democracy," an equality of all whites achieved by the perma-
nent subjugation of all blacks.38 The Jacksonian program had northern and
southern sectional variants, but both rested explicitly on black subordina-
tion, which was part of the equality "creed's cultural and socioeconomic
groundwork .... -"39 Jacksonian equality was social and political equality
for white men only, the Herrenmdnner. (It is one of history's ironies, there-
fore, that it was none other than Andrew Jackson who first used the phrase
"equal protection" in constitutional argument.40)
Not surprisingly, such an environment shriveled any proposal to ex-
tend legal equality to blacks, even those who were free. Chief Justice Le-
muel Shaw, giant of the antebellum judiciary, provided the leading judicial
exposition of equality under law for black Americans in Roberts v. City of
Boston, where he upheld racial segregation in Boston's public schools. To
Charles Sumner's argument for the equality of all people before the law,
Shaw replied that, while that was sound "as a broad general principle," it
could not mean equality of all people when "applied to the actual and vari-
ous conditions of persons in society." It could mean
only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are
equally entitled to the ... protection of the law, for their maintenance
and security. What those rights are, to which individuals, in the infinite
variety of circumstances by which they are surrounded in society, are en-
titled, must depend on laws adapted to their respective relations and con-
ditions.4
1
Under that vision, blacks were not entitled to be treated like whites,
but only like other blacks. In this Shavian interpretation, equality pertained
only within legally-specified groups, not among them. Anyone who could
legitimately claim a particular right was legally equal to all others who
could claim that same right, but this did not mean that different groups, not
so entitled, could claim the same right. To illustrate, if white males could
vote, each white man's vote had to be roughly equal to every other's, but
that did not entitle black men to vote. Shaw thus anticipated a difference
37. Jacksonian self-promotion was raised to canonical status by ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945), and more modestly affirmed by SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN (2005).
38. The phrase is George M. Fredrickson's. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY, at xi-xii, 154-55, 166 (1981).
Herrenvolk is German for "master race."
39. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN
LIFE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL HISTORY 167, 168 (Karen Halttunen & Lewis Perry eds.,
1998).
40. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 576, 590 (James D. Richardson ed., 1898).
41. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849).
20073
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
identified more than a century later, between "equality of treatment" and
"treatment as an equal."'42 After the Civil War, the Supreme Court affirmed
this principle in a nonracial context, demanding that the constraint of a law
apply equally to "all who ... [were] embraced by its prohibitions; thus
recognizing and preserving the principle of equality among those engaged
in the same [activities].
'43
What George Fredrickson has called "Herrenvolk egalitarianism" 44-
equality for and among white men only-was the conception of equality
that informed Roger B. Taney's Dred Scott opinion. The Declaration of
Independence and the political communities formed under its aegis "would
not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro
race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized Gov-
ernments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery."
They [Africans] had for more than a century before been regarded
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect ....
... [A] perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected
between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery,
and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power ....
As for the equality claim of the Declaration of Independence, Taney re-
solved that one simply by insisting that people of African descent "were
not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed
and adopted this declaration .... -"45 The opinion is irradiated with this
sense of equality as for and among whites only. That is exactly what
Taney's contemporaries, the abolitionists he feared and despised, were
determined to uproot.
A line of scholarly authority regards the Fourteenth Amendment as the
capstone of antebellum abolitionist constitutional thought.46 "[T]his aboli-
tionist understanding of equal protection, and of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is truer to both the plain language and the history of the Amendment"
42. Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights: The Consequences of Uncer-
tainty, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3, 10 (1977).
43. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888).
44. FREDRICKSON, supra note 38, at 166.
45. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-10 (1857).
46. See, e.g., DWIGHT LOWELL DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY: THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM IN
AMERICA (196 1); HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY," AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
(1968); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (rev. ed., Collier Books 1965) (1951); WIECEK,
supra note 33.
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than rival modem theories.47 Abolitionists were the first to think about
race-transcendent equality in a serious and positive way, and they were the
first to give the aspirational idea substantive content.
Embedded in Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment were
ideas propounded by innovative abolitionist lawyers and publicists before
the war, including equality before the law. Abolitionists demanded this not
as some abstract ideal, not as a vague statement or aspiration of antebellum
social conditions, but as the actual realization of the promise of the Decla-
ration of Independence for all people. Dismissed in its time (and after) as
impractical, utopian, 48 otherworldly, radical, or unreal, abolitionist thought
truly was the stone rejected by the builders that became the cornerstone,49
not least in its vision of equality.
Early opponents of slavery, aside from a few idealistic Quakers like
John Woolman and Anthony Benezet, had not embraced egalitarian princi-
ples. At most, they sought to protect free blacks from kidnapping in the
border states (both slave and free) and to provide social-welfare assistance,
in the form of jobs and schooling, for free blacks. Not until 1832 did Wil-
liam Lloyd Garrison broach the topic of authentic civil and political equal-
ity among white abolitionists. In the Constitution of the New-England Anti-
Slavery Society, Garrison insisted that "a mere difference of complexion is
no reason why any man should be deprived of any of his natural rights, or
subjected to any political disability." 50 Other nodes of immediatist anti-
slavery formed at the same time in New York City, Philadelphia, and the
Western Reserve in northern Ohio. While that was going on, the prosecu-
tion and mobbing of Prudence Crandall because she had begun a "High
School for young colored Ladies and Misses" in eastern Connecticut
opened white abolitionists' eyes to the virulence of racial prejudice around
them in the North. That drove them to an uncompromising egalitarianism
when they formed the first national antislavery group, the American Anti-
Slavery Society, in 1833.
Representatives of the antislavery nodes, including Garrison for New
England, Lucretia Mott and James McCrummel of Philadelphia, Beriah
Green from Ohio, and Lewis Tappan of the New York group, among oth-
ers, gathered in Philadelphia for the founding of the AA-SS. Garrison com-
47. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 11 (1994).
48. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 154
(1975).
49. Psalm 118:22.




posed its Declaration of Sentiments and Constitution, which uncompromis-
ingly demanded that African Americans should "according to their intellec-
tual and moral worth, share an equality with the whites, of civil and
religious privileges."
'51
The rhetorical unity of the AA-SS's convention and "Declaration of
Sentiments" masked an underlying split on the nature of equality between
Euro-American and African American abolitionists. At the first annual
Convention of the Free People of Color in Philadelphia in 1831, attitudinal
differences separated white and black abolitionists. Whites, including
Lewis Tappan, Garrison, and Simeon Jocelyn, assumed the reality of racial
differences. They thought of equality in terms of making opportunities for
blacks equal to those for whites, but they never abandoned their unques-
tioned belief in distinct racial categories. Though not racists themselves,
they nevertheless assumed not only the reality, but the centrality, of race. In
contrast, black leaders like James Forten, Richard Allen, and Samuel Cor-
nish considered race irrelevant, and instead emphasized individual oppor-
tunity unbounded by racial categorizing. 52 To oversimplify, Forten and the
others were anti-racist, while Tappan and his white colleagues continued to
see the social world as divided into black and white groupings, and may
have implicitly assumed superiority in the latter. This basic difference in
assumptions continued to distinguish white and black abolitionists through
the Civil War and contributed to divisions over the meaning of constitu-
tional equality. Ultimately, the whites' view prevailed, and equality was
cast in terms of providing blacks with the same benefits and burdens as
whites, rather than envisioning a society that had gotten beyond race to see
people as individuals, not as blacks or whites. Thus, for example, the cru-
cial catchall equality provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act provided that
"such citizens, of every race and color,... [shall be entitled to the] full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens .... -53
In the seven-year period of unity that followed the founding of the
AA-SS, abolitionists of all ideological (and skin) shades worked together
harmoniously to promote a constitutional program that attacked slavery
peripherally, as by abolishing it in the territories and the District of Colum-
bia. In time, though, as they split over political, ideological, and religious
51. AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, THE DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS AND CONSTITUTION
OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 8 (1835).
52. See James Brewer Stewart, The New Haven Negro College and the Meanings of Race in New
England, 1776-1870, 76 NEw ENG. Q. 323 (2003).
53. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
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agendas, 54 abolitionist factions were forced to confront the issue of what
equality would really mean in a post-emancipation America. Politically-
oriented abolitionists, when they formed the Liberty Party in 1844, de-
manded "the restoration of equality of rights, among men, in every State
where the [Liberty] Party exists," condemned all racially discriminatory
laws, and adopted the slogan of "Equal Rights. '55 The Liberty group soon
backslid on the equality issue, though, in the direction of an implicitly rac-
ist Free Soil position.
Not so their radical opponents, personified by Alvan Stewart, 56 Wil-
liam Goodell, 57 Gerrit Smith,58 Lysander Spooner, 59 Joel Tiffany,60 and,
after 1851, by Frederick Douglass.6 ' These men, of all the various (white)
abolitionist groups, faced the equality question most forthrightly and ex-
plicitly. In taking up the challenge of what was to become of enslaved
Americans after universal emancipation, they explored the possibilities of
the original Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause; 62 the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause; and various other, less likely, textual
possibilities to work out the legal status of the freedpeople. Two common
themes ran through much of their writing in this project: equality before the
law and protection by law for a person's rights. Equality for them meant
that the law must treat a black person exactly as it treated a white, no
worse, no better.
As abolitionist ideas infiltrated into the political mainstream in the two
decades preceding the Civil War, they found a home in the new Republican
54. See WIECEK, supra note 33, at 150-275.
55. I NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1956, at 4-8 (Donald Bruce Johnson ed., rev. ed.
1978).
56. See Alvan Stewart, Argument, on the Question Whether the New [New Jersey] Constitution of
1844 Abolished Slavery in New Jersey, in WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALVAN STEWART, ON
SLAVERY 272-367 (Luther Rawson Marsh ed., 1860). The New Jersey Supreme Court disappointed
Stewart, holding that it did not. See State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368 (Sup. Ct. 1845).
57. See WILLIAM GOODELL, VIEWS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IN ITS BEARING UPON
AMERICAN SLAVERY (2d ed. 1845).
58. See LETTER OF GERRIT SMITH TO S.P. CHASE, ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF EVERY
PART OF AMERICAN SLAVERY (1847).
59. See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1860); Lysander
Spooner, Has Slavery in the United States a Legal Basis?, 2 MASS. Q. REV. 145, 145-68, 274-93
(1848). These articles, published anonymously, have also been attributed to Richard Hildreth.
60. See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY
(1849).
61. Douglass converted sometime between 1850 and 1851 from a Garrisonian negativism to the
radical position. Compare Frederick Douglass, Is the Constitution Pro-Slavery? (Jan. 31, 1850), in 2
THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 217 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1982) (answering yes), with
Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? (July 5, 1852), in 2 THE FREDERICK
DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra, at 359, 384-86 (answering on second thought, no). See generally JAMES A.
COLAIACO, FREDERICK DOUGLASS AND THE FOURTH OF JULY 73-107 (2006).
62. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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Party after 1854. But the issue of equality fractured the Republicans as it
had the abolitionists. At this juncture, equality's potential diverged. In the
half decade before the Civil War, some members of the new party carried
forward their Free Soil heritage, but with a distinctly racist emphasis. They
demanded that slavery be kept out of the territories, but principally or en-
tirely for the purpose of preserving the West as a domain of white migra-
tion.63 Egalitarian Republicans like Joshua Giddings, Salmon P. Chase,
Charles Sumner, John A. Bingham,64 and Thaddeus Stevens were distinctly
a minority in the party. But pressures of the war, followed by southern
recalcitrance and presidential intransigence after Appomattox, diverted the
Republican non-abolitionist mainstream in their direction. Republicans
who did not have abolitionist antecedents, or for whom antislavery values
had ranked low in priority-like the influential Ohio Representative Sam-
uel Shellabarger or Maine's William Pitt Fessenden in the Senate-came
around to accepting some measure of equality when it became apparent that
nothing less could preserve the Union.
The old Revolutionary-era concept of equality had posed an easy chal-
lenge for Americans: majorities had to protect themselves from numerically
small (though economically powerful) minorities. The new abolitionist
egalitarianism took on a vastly more difficult task: to protect racially-
defined minorities against a majority driven by inveterate prejudice and
self-interest to exploit those minorities. Under that new order, what kind of
mechanisms had to be built into the Constitution to assure so utopian a
project? And how would "majority" be defined? A majority of the people
of the nation? Majorities in sections? In states? Americans after emancipa-
tion had to invent a whole new substantive content for the vision of equal-
ity.
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND ITS FRAMERS' INTENTS
The Civil War and Reconstruction provided an opportunity for doing
just that. The original Constitution had established a political order in
which a "People" constituted themselves as such by rigidly excluding from
full civil status in the polity and from the law's full protection more than
three-quarters of the people inhabiting the territory of the new nation: all
those racially distinct from Euro-Americans, women, minors, resident
aliens, and those others who were shut out by criteria of class and religion.
63. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 261-300 (1970).
64. On Bingham's egalitarianism and commitment to abolition, see ERVING E. BEAUREGARD,
BINGHAM OF THE HILLS: POLITICIAN AND DIPLOMAT EXTRAORDINARY 17-26, 93-101 (1989).
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The supreme value of this exclusive and ascriptive People was liberty, de-
fined as negative liberty-being left alone by government. This was to be
realized in a confederation of republican states.
The Civil War and the abortive revolution of Reconstruction created a
much different order, in which the source of national self-identity became
the republican nation, rather than that abstract collective, "the People." The
supreme value of liberty, along with its implicit qualification, for white
men only, morphed into something radically different: the sibling values of
freedom and equality, to be realized through a national democracy.65 This
idea had ancient roots: Cicero considered liberty and equality to be neces-
sary complements to each other in a free society of equal citizens. 66
The revolutionary outcome of the war was followed by a counterrevo-
lution, however, which for the better part of a century triumphed. The value
of equality in the Fourteenth Amendment was entirely new, incompatible
with the preferences of the vast majority of white Americans who wielded
political power, violently resisted in the states of the former Confederacy,
and posed a direct challenge to universally prevalent racist assumptions
held by Euro-Americans. It was the program for a new social order that
nearly all white Americans could scarcely imagine and, to the extent that
they could, flatly rejected.
Because the equality value was so incompatible with what had gone
before, its appearance in the Fourteenth Amendment marked a revolution-
ary change. 67 Its content and contours were unknown, unmapped, and even
unimagined. Certainly a majority of white Americans at the time would
have spurned its fullest implications: social equality, erasure of race lines,
and a completely equitable and impartial distribution of society's opportu-
nities, without any race favoritism.
To some critics, then as now,68 equality is incompatible with liberty,
or with the idea of rights. It comports uncomfortably with the values of
classical liberalism-individualism and competition-and is reconciled
with them, if at all, only through the slogan of "equality of opportunity,"
65. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001). Take special note of the table in FLETCHER, supra, at 55.
66. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA 1.32, at 57 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans.,
1928).
67. Henry Steele Commager, Equal Protection as an Instrument of Revolution, in
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 467 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1980).
68. See, e.g., Jean Baechler, Liberty, Property, and Equality, in 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY 269 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); Lester J. Mazor, The Exhaustion of the Ideals of
Freedom and Equality in the United States, in I EQUALITY AND FREEDOM: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 175 (Gray Dorsey ed., 1977) [hereinafter EQUALITY AND FREEDOM];
Stuart S. Nagel, Issues Regarding Tensions Between Goals of Equality and Freedom, in 2 EQUALITY
AND FREEDOM, supra, at 603.
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often contrasted with "equality of results," a false dichotomy that has para-
lyzed the vision of the modem Court. Similarly, some see equality as dis-
sonant with the ideal of distributive justice, captured in the maxim of
Roman law, give to each his due. 69 Little wonder, then, that debates on
equality values have been so contentious-and continue to be.
What, then, did the Framers have in mind for the Equal Protection
Clause? To start with, they explicitly and deliberately meant to reject the
constitutional order described in Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion
and replace it with one that was in all respects its opposite, at least as far as
the status of black Americans was concerned. 70 In that execrable opinion,
Taney had written that blacks had not been included in "We the People of
the United States" 71 because they were "considered as a subordinate and
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their author-
ity .... " Blacks were "a class of beings whom [the white people of the
states] had thus stigmatized;... and upon whom they had impressed such
deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation .... ,,72 In reaction
to that claim, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment insisted that in the
new postwar order, there was to be no "subordinate and inferior class of
beings," no "dominant race," no people marked by law and custom with
"such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation." Instead, all
people and groups of people were to stand equal before the laws of the
states and the nation. John Bingham, the father of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Section 1, summed up the concept pithily: "the absolute equality
before the law of all persons .... ,"73 Whatever rights the states conferred or
disabilities they imposed on whites had to apply in the same measure to
blacks. Thus the centrality of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause, which was the capstone of Section 1 in the Republican
Framers' minds.
This "anti-Dred Scott" reading of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment derives from the Section's structure. All four of its provisions enforce
the same equality ideal, but in four different ways. The first sentence
69. "Suum cuique tribuere," which Ulpian defined as one of the three basic principles of right. I
THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 10 (Alan Watson ed., 1985).
70. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-16 (1977). But see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 40-63 (1988) (arguing that Section
I of the Fourteenth Amendment was ambiguous, the product of the Framers' political compromises,
and that its specific legal meaning and impact was only emergent).
71. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
72. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05, 416 (1857).
73. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 158 (1865).
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tence confers federal and state citizenship on "all persons born or natural-
ized in the United States." The content and meaning of the three provisions
in the second sentence follow from that recognition of citizenship, seen as
formal embodiment in the polity. The next clause provides that the states
may not abridge the "privileges or immunities" of the "citizens of the
United States" who had been created in the preceding sentence. This re-
versed the citizenship part of Taney's Dred Scott holding by constitutional
amendment. The third and fourth components extend "due process of law"
and "the equal protection of the laws" to any "person." These provisions
brought within the ambit of law those people whom Taney had declared
outside its protections. The second sentence was more in the nature of a
single package of related rights than a catalogue of three distinct, freestand-
ing rights. Thus, due process was to be more an aspect of equal protection
than an alternative to it. And similarly the other way around: equal protec-
tion would be an aspect of due process, justifying the result in Boiling v.
Sharpe.74
In Section 5 the Framers explicitly empowered Congress "to en-
force... the provisions of this article." Although the potential scope of this
power was not clear then (or now, for that matter75), it was certainly be-
yond quibble that Congress now had enforcement powers over the citizen-
ship, privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection rights
affirmed in Section 1.
A second unquestionable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866,76 whose constitutional validity had
been challenged by Andrew Johnson in his veto message and by conserva-
tives of both parties in Congress. Contemporary concepts of equality before
the law, understood in the privileges and immunities context, were most
fully captured in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.77 That measure, enacted as its
title proclaimed "to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil
Rights," first conferred national citizenship. It then affirmed that all citi-
zens "shall have the same right... to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property" as whites. The Act protected the rights
of contract, property, and juridical capacity (as witness and party) of those
citizens. Its concluding passage codified the antebellum ideal of equality
74. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
75. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
76. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
77. See id.; John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of the "Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421. This article is a revised version of an article of the same
title published at 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950).
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
before the law in comprehensive, lawyerly language by extending to those
citizens the "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the secu-
rity of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and [they] shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. '' 78 The Fourteenth Amendment affirmed all those rights and equalities.
Finally, the Thirty-Ninth Congress was determined to use national au-
thority if necessary to suppress the crimes and disorders documented by
Carl Schurz and others in their travels through the ex-Confederacy, and
summarized in the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.
79
These included the escalating terrorism of white counterrevolutionaries, the
murderous mob violence directed at freedpeople in Memphis and New
Orleans in 1866, and, above all, the Black Codes that had attempted to
reinstate the two essentials of slavery: race control and labor coercion.
The Framers' intentions with respect to the Equal Protection Clause
have been debated endlessly and inconclusively since 1868, as Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren noted in Brown 1.80 Whatever the Clause might mean,
require, or forbid, though, a consensus holds that its framers at a minimum
meant it to prohibit the states from enacting or enforcing laws that treated
the freedpeople more opprobriously than similar laws treated others of
European descent. Even the most minimalist reading of the Clause con-
cedes that it was meant to secure the status, fundamental liberties, and legal
capacity of all citizens, black and white, against state oppression. Justices
of the Supreme Court who were contemporaries of the Framers repeatedly
confirmed that reading. Thus, Samuel Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases
wrote,
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading pur-
pose of them.... it is not difficult to give a meaning to [the Equal Pro-
tection] clause. The existence of laws in the States where the newly
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice
and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this
clause .... 81
Justice William Strong wrote in Strauder v. West Virginia that the "com-
mon purpose" of the Civil War Amendments was to "secur[e] to a race
recently emancipated... all the civil rights the superior race enjoy." "What
is [equal protection]," he went on, "but declaring ... in regard to the col-
78. Act of Apr. 9, 1866 § 1, 14 Stat. at 27.
79. See H.R. REP. NO. 39-30 (1866); CARL SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH
(Arno Press 1969) (1867).
80. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954); see also Alexander M. Bickel,
The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
81. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). Miller was referring to the Black Codes of 1865-66.
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ored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed,
that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their
color?" 82 The modem Court has reconfirmed this. "The clear and central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment," Chief Justice Warren declared in
Loving v. Virginia, "was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious
racial discrimination in the States. '83 In McLaughlin v. Florida, the Court
held that "the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to elimi-
nate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States." 84
However, that is a minimal reading, and its state-action emphasis con-
stricts the potential of the Clause. The Framers contemplated two different
approaches to the problems they faced in 1867. The first would have been a
simple but limited ban on state discrimination on the basis of race. 85 Thad-
deus Stevens proposed such a formulation in the earliest debates on what
became the Fourteenth Amendment: "All national and state laws shall be
equally applicable to every citizen, and no discrimination shall be made on
account of race and color."' 86 He later elaborated:
[The proposed equal protection amendment] allows Congress to correct
the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates
upon one man shall operate equally upon all. Whatever law punishes a
white man for a crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same
way and to the same degree. Whatever law protects the white man shall
afford "equal" protection to the black man. Whatever means of redress is
afforded to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white
man to testify in court shall allow the man of color to do the same. 87
Such an ideal was alien to antebellum society.
The Thirty-Ninth Congress, however, rejected Stevens's proposal in
favor of a broader equality principle. (Non-discrimination and equality are
not the same thing, then or now.) John A. Bingham urged this broader ap-
proach the day after Stevens spoke. He would give Congress power "to
pass all necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons in every State of
the Union equal protection in their rights, life, liberty, and property .... "88
As the debates wore on through the winter of 1865-66, the Joint Commit-
tee on Reconstruction adopted the Bingham approach over that proffered
by Stevens and began tacking onto it the notion of privileges, immunities
(both of which survived), and "equal political rights" (which did not).
82. 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1880).
83. 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
84. 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
85. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 67-87 (1992).
86. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865).
87. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (Statement of Rep. Stevens).
88. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865).
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Though Stevens continued to push the weaker non-discrimination formula,
he also added the critical provision that "Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Finally,
the Joint Committee melded these various formulations, adding the ineffec-
tual reduced-representation provision of Section 2, the disfranchisement
provision of Section 3, and the debt provisions of Section 4. In that version,
representing the triumph of the Bingham broad approach, the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted and sent to the states for ratification.
The Bingham equality principle was less clear than non-
discrimination. It was more amorphous, less infused with identifiable con-
tent. Despite-or because of-that, though, it was more potent. Courts, and
if necessary Congress itself, would have the responsibility of giving it legal
definition and content. It contained a greater potential for growth than the
simple, negative non-discrimination principle. Both those features, how-
ever, had a dark side. In an inhospitable climate, such as that which de-
scended after 1875, equality could be construed away to meaninglessness,
and form could be exalted over substance. Equality would work only if
there was a broad popular commitment to its ideal, and that never existed at
any time in the nineteenth century.
The language of the Clause, read in light of the circumstances of 1868
and Chief Justice John Marshall's command in McCulloch v. Maryland that
the Constitution be read to allow for the growth of principle to accommo-
date social change,89 suggests more interpretive possibilities. A well-
developed state common law tradition provided at least four principles of
equal protection by 1868.90 These were the "equality principle": all persons
are moral equals before the law; the "reasonableness principle": laws must
not be arbitrary or unreasonable; the "impartiality principle": laws must be
administered impartially, allocating society's burdens and benefits fairly;
and the "protection principle": laws must protect individuals' fundamental
rights. A half century of modem development has winnowed these into
something quite different: a two-category organization of "suspect classifi-
cations" and "fundamental rights." But that current configuration of doc-
89. The Chief Justice commanded,
[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.... a constitution intended
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.... It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigen-
cies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for
as they occur.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407-15 (1819).
90. John Marquez Lundin, The Law of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1137 (1999).
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trine does not fully realize the scope of the equality principle at the time it
was written into the Constitution.
"[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal re-
sults," wrote Justice Potter Stewart in 1979.91 But of course it guarantees
neither: it guarantees the equal protection of the laws.92 This mandated that
the state provide the protection of law to all its citizens, which would com-
ply with John Marshall's command in Marbury v. Madison that "[t]he very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the
first duties of government is to afford that protection. '93
That raises one of the earliest and most important questions to come
up under the new Equal Protection Clause: Does a state violate the Clause
by failing to act when one of its citizens was injured by private violence?
Does inaction-failure to remedy a wrong retrospectively or provide a
remedy prospectively-constitute such state action? This was yet another
manifestation of the still-unresolved question about the nature of the
American Constitution: Does it guarantee only negative liberties, freedom
from overt, proactive oppression by the state? Or, does it go further, assur-
ing all people that the state will protect them against deprivation of rights
from whatever source of oppression? Chief Judge Richard Posner has re-
cently framed that issue this way: is the Constitution "a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties"? Even if it is, as he thinks, the former, "where
the liberty asserted is ... the right to equal treatment irrespective of race or
sex, the analysis is more complex." "The central purpose of the equal pro-
tection clause, made clear by its wording," he maintained, "is to prevent
states from withdrawing legal protection from minorities, thereby making
the members of minority groups outlaws in the literal sense."'94 The jurist
for whom Posner once clerked, Justice William Brennan, thought that state
"inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action. . . ."95 The Su-
preme Court had to take up these issues even before the ink was dry on the
parchment of the Amendment.
In an 1871 circuit court case, United States v. Hall, Judge William
Woods, later to be appointed to the United States Supreme Court, claimed
91. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
92. Compare WEST, supra note 47, at 11, with the vastly narrower (and inadequate) understanding
of protection in Alfred Avins, The Equal "Protection " of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12
N.Y. L.F. 385 (1966).
93. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
94. Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189-90 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring).
95. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); accord Roger Paul Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 303
(1959).
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that the Amendment did in fact reach state inaction. He stated in dictum
that Congress could protect the privileges and immunities secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment against "unfriendly or insufficient state legisla-
tion.... ." A state could violate the Equal Protection Clause by "the omis-
sion to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for protection. '96 For
that brief moment, one prominent American jurist acknowledged a state's
affirmative duty to protect all of its people. Even in a decision otherwise
disastrous for black liberties, the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Joseph Bradley
suggested in dictum that "if [state] laws are adverse to [the freedman's]
rights and do not protect him, his remedy will be found in the corrective
legislation which Congress has adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting
the effect of State laws .... ,"97 But there was a fatal slippage in Bradley's
formulation, compared with Woods's. Woods implied that a state must
provide protection; Bradley bypassed that issue and said merely that Con-
gress "may" enact corrective laws where the state defaulted.
Aside from text, the "architecture" of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment suggests an affirmative content for the Equal Protection
Clause. Section 1 consists of four guarantees, packaged in two sentences.
The first sentence confers citizenship, the foundational right, establishing
an individual civic identity and status for all members of the republic. This
citizenship secures an equality of participation by all people in public af-
fairs. 98 Read against the first sentence of Section 1, the three rights af-
firmed in the succeeding sentence-privileges and immunities, equal
protection, and due process-can be understood as the effective realization
of that citizenship, the ways in which the Framers saw fit to achieve the
equal citizenship they had just proclaimed. We may therefore look to the
nature of citizenship to get an idea of the meaning of equality and equal
protection.
The equality component of equal citizenship secures at least two
things: state protection of the individual's status as a citizen and a human
being, an attribute best summed up in the idea of dignity, and the individ-
ual's participation in the life of the polity as a fully-empowered citizen-
member. As Justice William Strong expressed the idea in 1880, the Equal
Protection Clause bars state actions "implying inferiority in civil soci-
ety .... ."99 At a minimum, the citizenship/equality right assures that neither
the individual nor the group will be excluded from the polity. In recent
96. 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
97. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
98. See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989).
99. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
[Vol 82:233
THE EMERGENCE OF EQUALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
times, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has recurred to this notion of civic
standing and inclusion in Establishment Clause cases, 100 but the value is
more obviously and compellingly grounded in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In this sense, Brown v. Board of Education I was fully justi-
fied in terms of the Framers' intent, as it secured the two core values of
equal citizenship: dignity and participation. There is a danger today that the
dignity component may be demoted from its constitutional status as a right
under the aegis of the Equal Protection Clause to a mere interest protected
by tort laws protecting privacy. 101
III. CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, 1873-1905102
Scholars agree that the Equal Protection Clause fared badly before the
United States Supreme Court as soon as it became the subject of appellate
litigation. Justice Lewis Powell was merely reiterating received wisdom
when he noted in 1978 that the Equal Protection Clause "was virtually
strangled in its infancy by post-civil-war judicial reactionism. It was rele-
gated to decades of relative desuetude while the Due Process
Clause ... flourished .... 1"103 There is much truth in that view, particularly
for the leading civil rights cases of the first generation. In the Civil Rights
Cases, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Williams v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court
connived at the assaults of Jim Crow and disfranchisement. 104 It embraced
a formalistic approach to the Clause that left the guarantee of equality de-
void of meaning. In its debilitated state, the Clause almost merited the
scorn of Justice Holmes in 1927 as "the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments .... "105
In these late-nineteenth-century cases, the Court fabricated an engine
of law that gutted the substance of the Civil War Amendments, and particu-
larly the Equal Protection Clause, as far as the freedpeople were concerned,
while preserving the Amendment's fagade as a sort of Potemkin village of
100. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 626 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(contrasting those "not full members of the political community" with "favored members of the politi-
cal community"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (affirming
"a person's standing in the political community").
101. See generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA (2000).
102. Much of this section is also discussed in my previous article William M. Wiecek, Civil Rights:
Looking Back-Looking Forward, 4 BARRY L. REV. 21 (2003).
103. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (internal quotations and
footnote omitted).
104. Michael J. Klarman surveys these cases authoritatively in FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8-60 (2004).
105. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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human decency. In this way the Court supported the destruction of blacks'
rights and the imposition of apartheid maintained by the forms of law,
which in turn were backed by legal and extra-legal violence. Scholars refer
to the Court's performance in these cases as the "retreat from Reconstruc-
tion." 106 These decisions were in synch with the dominant social and attitu-
dinal trends of the era in matters of race. One way of thinking about
American social and political history in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century is to see it as the birth (or rebirth) of a "Jim Crow republic," a na-
tion dedicated to apartheid. 107 The results of the Court's decisions were
congruent with that result.
We should not, however, be surprised that judges betrayed the expec-
tations of the Clause's drafters. Rather, it is remarkable that the betrayal
was as moderate as it was. Given the incompatibility, to put it mildly, of
abolitionist ideals with the social realities of postwar America, the Court's
original interpretation of the Clause appears more a compromise between
those who would render it an absolute nullity and those who sought some
measure of legal protection for the freedpeople.
The cases of this period displayed four characteristics fatal to equality
for black Americans:
1. They conceded only a formal, minimalist interpretation of the con-
stitutional text provided by the Reconstruction Amendments, leav-
ing the door wide open for subterfuge and subversion.
2. They gave only a grudging, narrow reading to statutes enacted to
protect blacks' rights.
3. The Court invented the state-action doctrine.
4. It applied the same constitutional standard, such as the Commerce
Clause, inerrantly in a differential, results-oriented way to achieve
results destructive of blacks' rights.
These decisions comprised a corpus of law that ratified Jim Crow, disfran-
chisement, and economic subordination.
The Court disappointed the Reconstruction Framers' hopes for Afri-
can Americans in nearly all the cases that came before it in the last third of
the nineteenth century, beginning with the first time it construed the Four-
teenth Amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases. Though Justice Samuel F.
Miller repeatedly emphasized that "the one pervading purpose" of the Civil
War Amendments was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
106. FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT'S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: A
DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE passim (2000).
107. See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, I I CONST. COMMENT.
115 passim (1994).
[Vol 82:233
THE EMERGENCE OF EQUALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made free-
man and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him," his conservative understanding of the revo-
lution in federalism wrought by the war betrayed the freedpeople. For both
the definition of their fundamental liberties and the protection of those
liberties, Slaughterhouse consigned the flock to the care of the wolves, the
racist Democratic Redeemer regimes then coming into power. "[T]he entire
domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States"
would continue to be a state responsibility, with the federal government
excluded from an effective role in policing them. The Supreme Court was
not to become "a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the
civil rights of their own citizens .... -108
The Court did not perpetrate this betrayal of black Americans solely
on its own initiative. The entire apparatus of Miller's opinion rested upon,
and at the same time affirmed, a cluster of assumptions or ideological pref-
erences about the related issues of race, federalism, and Reconstruction. 109
Based on northern Democratic beliefs about the causes of the Civil War,
the Slaughterhouse majority assumed that the abolition of slavery by 1865
had resolved all problems related to the peculiar institution; that slavery
had no consequences beyond the status of its immediate victims, the freed-
people; that the antebellum federal system should be disturbed as little as
possible by postwar adjustments; and that states retained exclusive sover-
eign authority over all internal matters, including the rights of their citizens.
Each of these assumptions is contestable or just downright wrong, 10 but
the Supreme Court's version of historical "truth," once imposed, controls
subsequent constitutional development, no matter how false or partial it
may be.
Slaughterhouse takes on meaning only in the context of what was
happening to the freedpeople as Miller wrote. The White Supremacist re-
gimes that took control of the southern state governments after 1876 cre-
ated an elaborate net of statutory law that ensnared blacks in labor regimes
108. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71, 77-78 (1873); see also RONALD M. LABBt & JONATHAN LURIE,
THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
154-221 (2003).
109. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 1-95 (1999).
110. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877
(1988); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 232-515 (1982); Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom:
Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughterhouse Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627
(1994).
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of de facto servitude."' 1 At the same time, they and local governments
codified the racial etiquette of Jim Crow in endless and demeaning petty
regulations that trumpeted white domination and black subservience, forc-
ing everyone to conform to a ritual of behavior that reinforced those social
roles., 12
Following Slaughterhouse, the Court handed down a line of decisions
that were hostile to black Americans' rights under the Civil War Amend-
ments. This was due in part to the Court's conformity to the attitudes of the
era, above all with the racist assumptions that were reasserting themselves
triumphantly over short-lived Republican/abolitionist idealism.
In United States v. Reese, the Court unanimously held unconstitutional
two sections of one of the 1870 Force Acts1 13 on the grounds that the ban
on wrongful interference by state officials with voting was not limited to
racially-motivated actions and thus was overbroad. "The Fifteenth
Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one," Chief
Justice Waite then proclaimed gratuitously."l 4 (That same year, he repeated
the point in a different sort of civil rights case, Minor v. Happersett,115
upholding the power of a state to deny the ballot to women, despite the
Fourteenth Amendment.) On the other hand, the Court sustained convic-
tions under another section of the 1870 Force Act for denying a black voter
the opportunity to vote in a congressional election, but only on Article I
grounds, not the Fourteenth Amendment. 116 In that same year, the Court
overturned indictments against white rioters who had terrorized a black
political rally on the Reese grounds that the indictments did not specify the
necessary racial animus.1 17
The Court also promoted Jim Crow in railway transportation. Hall v.
DeCuir18 voided a state statute prohibiting segregation on public convey-
ances (in this case, a riverboat) on the grounds that this would constitute a
11 1. WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE
QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL 1861-1915 passim (1991).
112. On the vexed question of the origins of Jim Crow, compare the classic studies of C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974), and C. VANN WOODWARD,
ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913 (1951), with later critics, especially JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE
CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION
(1984), and HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH 1865-1890 (1980).
113. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
114. 92 U.S. 214,217 (1875).
115. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) ("[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer
the right of suffrage upon any one ... ").
116. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); accord Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)
(non-racial context).
117. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
118. 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
(Vol 82:233
THE EMERGENCE OF EQUALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
direct burden on interstate commerce and an interference with Congress's
powers to regulate it. Yet perversely, in Louisville, New Orleans & Texas
Railway Co. v. Mississippi,119 the Justices upheld a state Jim Crow railway
ordinance against a Commerce Clause challenge on the grounds that the
statute had only an intrastate operation, despite the obvious interruption of
interstate travel as trains had to stop at state lines to herd black passengers
into Jim Crow cars. Such incongruities made it plain that the Court was
deciding cases involving the rights of African Americans by a double stan-
dard, sustaining measures that contributed to degradation of blacks' status,
while striking down those that attempted to deliver on the promises of
equality in the Civil War Amendments.
In a quartet of 1880 jury cases, the Court appeared to vindicate the
rights of blacks as parties and jurors, yet it undercut these advances in a
self-defeating manner. 120 Strauder v. West Virginia, the best known of the
jury cases, is conventionally cited for its encouraging dictum that "[w]hat is
[equal protection] but declaring ... in regard to the colored race, for whose
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination
shall be made against them by law because of their color?" On that basis,
the Justices struck down a state statute limiting jury service to whites. But
in a gratuitous dictum, Justice William Strong, who wrote for the Court in
all these cases, affirmed the power of states to prescribe juror qualifica-
tions, "and in so doing make discriminations" on the basis of sex, property
ownership, age, and education. 121 It would be a dull sheriff indeed who
could not exclude all blacks under that gaping concession.
In Ex parte Virginia,122 the Court upheld the conviction of a state
judge under an 1875 federal statute barring racial discrimination in the
selection of jurors123 for systematically excluding blacks from grand and
petty juries. Yet in Virginia v. Rives, 124 it declined to overturn a conviction
of two black defendants who claimed that blacks had been excluded from
all juries in their county. In dicta, the Court held that no one had a right to
have members of their race serve on a petty jury and that the fact that no
blacks had ever served on a local jury was not evidence that they had been
systematically excluded.
119. 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
120. See generally Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1401 (1983).
121. 100 U.S. 303, 307, 309-10 (1880).
122. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
123. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336.
124. 100 U.S. 313 (1880). The next year, however, the Court did concede that such a record consti-




The Court was prey to a vitiating formalism in the black-rights cases
of the late nineteenth century. Pace v. Alabama125 was typical. There the
Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of Alabama statutes that
imposed higher penalties for fornication and adultery when committed by a
biracial couple than when done by a same-race couple. Justice Stephen J.
Field, a Democrat and no friend of African Americans, held that the stat-
utes treated all alike, working no discrimination in any single offense be-
tween blacks and whites. In his brief opinion, he saw no need to explain
why the differential between the statutes was not invidious. In Pace, the
substance of equality shriveled to a nominal, formal impartiality that belied
Jim Crow reality.
In 1883, the Court struck a staggering blow to the possibility of
blacks' full participation in American life in the Civil Rights Cases. Void-
ing the public accommodations sections of the 1875 Civil Rights Act,126
Justice Joseph Bradley affirmed earlier hints of the state-action doctrine,
limiting Congress's remedial and regulatory authority under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to actions "by State authority in the shape of
laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings."' 127 Bradley added to
the damage by also holding that racial discrimination was not a badge or
incident of slavery. He vented impatient annoyance at the continuing ef-
forts to realize the promise of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments:
"When a man has emerged from slavery,. . . there must be some stage in
the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws," a taunting mockery of the
freedpeople's increasingly dire plight in the Jim Crow South. 128 Bradley's
opinion assumed the answer to the question whether state inaction could be
reached under the Fourteenth Amendment (certainly not), rather than con-
fronting it forthrightly. Justice John M. Harlan's lone dissent, like his later
dissent in Plessy, is widely taken to be the more authentic and valid reading
of the Civil War Amendments, but Bradley's state-action doctrine has dis-
played stubborn staying power, coming back after ceaseless critiques
whenever conservative jurists feel a need to insulate racially discriminatory
acts from federal regulatory or remedial power. 129 The Court repeated the
125. 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
126. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 335, 336.
127. Numerous scholarly authorities have criticized the state-action doctrine as anomalous, un-
founded, and unnecessary. The most thorough is LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1688-1719 (2d ed. 1988). See also HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 109, at 497-500; Frank &
Munro, supra note 77.
128. 109 U.S. 3, 17, 25 (1883).
129. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (opinion by Rehnquist, J.).
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state-action doctrine in United States v. Harris,130 overturning convictions
for the lynching of a black man on the ground that there was no state action
involved. Harris signaled that federal authority would be powerless to pro-
tect African Americans from the wave of terror then underway.
Three years later the Court inconsistently rendered one of its few nine-
teenth-century opinions succoring the cause of minority rights, but signifi-
cantly in a case that did not involve African Americans. (The victims of
this discrimination were Chinese launderers.) In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Jus-
tice Stanley Matthews went behind a facially non-discriminatory San Fran-
cisco ordinance interpreted to forbid laundries in wood-frame buildings, to
find that it was "administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances .... ." Cryptically, Matthews
observed in dictum that "the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws." 131 Yick Wo became the ancestor of a long line of
cases condemning as-applied discrimination and raised the issue, still
vexed, of inferences to be drawn about intent from effects. However, in the
short term it did black Americans little good. Its principle would not be
applied to relieve blacks from the onus of facially neutral statutes for an-
other fifty years.
Having made this promising concession to the realities of race, the
Court then snatched it away from African Americans when it returned to
the perennial exclusion of blacks from juries. In 1896 (an annus horribilis
for blacks), given the choice between Yick Wo and Rives, Chief Justice
Melville Weston Fuller refused to go behind facially neutral juror-selection
processes to root out racial disqualification. 132
[W]hether such [racial] discrimination was practiced in this case was a
question of fact, and the determination of that question adversely to
plaintiff in error by [Texas courts] was decisive, so far as this court is
concerned, unless it could be held that these decisions constitute such
abuse as amounted to an infraction of the Federal Constitution, which
cannot be presumed .... 133
Plessy v. Ferguson134 has been so often quoted and condemned 135 that
it is neither possible nor necessary to find something new to denounce in its
130. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
131. 118 U.S. 356, 369, 373-74 (1886).
132. See Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896).
133. Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 282 (1909).
134. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
135. The modem Court is unanimous in its denunciation. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joint opinion; Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
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constitutionalization of Jim Crow. 136 Lower federal courts had confronted
two different interpretations of the meaning of equality. Did it mean access
for all, irrespective of race, to the same accommodation, or provision of
what whites claimed to be separate but "equal" facilities? For a generation,
judges consistently affirmed the latter meaning, 137 and the Supreme Court
ratified that view in Plessy. On mature reflection later, Justice Henry
Brown concluded that he had erred in his majority opinion, 138 but the pro-
found and long-lasting damage had been done. Plessy's basic doctrine, that
states may make "reasonable" racial classifications, was destined for a long
career. Not until McLaughlin v. Florida did the Court repudiate it and re-
place it with a universal presumption against the validity of all racial classi-
fications. 139
Andrew Kull makes this arresting observation about Plessy, however:
"[N]o subsequent decision by the United States Supreme Court ever re-
ferred to Plessy v. Ferguson as a guide to the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 140 He suggests that, in its first decades at least, Plessy had
not become the formidable barrier to racial equality that it seemed to be
after World War II. It did not mandate precise equality as the price for seg-
regation; rather, it allowed state legislatures broad leeway in determining
what measure of equality was reasonable, so that any gesture, however
nominal, of pretextual equality would suffice.
The Court closed out the century with Williams v. Mississippi,14 1 an
exercise in pure formalism that sustained the so-called Mississippi Plan that
disfranchised most black men in the southern states by imposing an ingen-
ious array of facially neutral voting qualifications that had the practical and
intended effect of eliminating the black voter. 142 That it also had the effect
136. On the case, see 8 OWEN M. FisS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-
1910, at 352-67 (1993), and CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION (1987).
137. See Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the
"Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 17 (1984).
138. Joel Goldfarb, Henry Billings Brown, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969, at 1553, 1562 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
139. See 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
140. Andrew Kull, Post-Plessy, Pre-Brown: "Logical Exactness " in Enforcing Equal Rights, 24 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 155, 164 (1999) (emphasis omitted). He notes two minor exceptions, both involving
transportation: Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900), and Chiles v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
141. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
142. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION
AND THE SHAPING OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974). Kousser provides a melancholy
update of this study, demonstrating a similar and parallel formalism on the modem Court that dimin-
ishes black electoral influence, in COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDO-
ING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999).
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of disfranchising many a poor white was a welcome side effect as far as the
Bourbon sponsors of the measure were concerned. The Court, speaking
through Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, compounded the damage of Wil-
liams five years later in Giles v. Harris,143 denying equitable relief to a
black voter disfranchised under an Alabama variant of the Mississippi Plan.
In a cynical and disingenuous opinion, 144 Holmes insisted that federal
courts could do nothing about racial disfranchisement, no matter how obvi-
ous, and consigned them to Congress and the President 145 for political
remedies.
The Court gave the lie to the nominal evenhandedness of separate-but-
equal in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education.14 6 A Georgia
county operating one high school for whites and another for blacks shut-
tered the latter, citing fiscal exigency. It thus provided a high school educa-
tion for whites, but nothing beyond primary grades for blacks. The Court
found no violation of equal protection in this arrangement. Justice Harlan
(!) for a unanimous Court reasoned that compelling the county to close the
white school as well would do blacks no good, as specious a specimen of
judicial logic as can be found in the United States Reports. In Berea Col-
lege v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,'4 7 the Court upheld the power of a
state to impose Jim Crow on private schools, which had the effect of expel-
ling the black students from that progressive school.
CONCLUSION
At the turn of the twentieth century, the equality value remained in the
textual Constitution, but it was a dead letter; metaphorically, it was a mis-
sive sent but not delivered for lack of a recipient, reposing unclaimed but
available for delivery when interest in it should revive. The Supreme Court
had preserved it by accommodating the text and its implicit ideal with the
prevalent racism of the era. Its day was still a half century away.
143. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
144. Owen Fiss more charitably attributes the opinion to Holmes's fatalism and a sense of impo-
tence. See FISS, supra note 135, at 372-79.
145. A useless recourse: the president at the time, Theodore Roosevelt, in three years would dis-
grace his administration by sustaining the army's conduct in the Brownsville, Texas incident. In racial
matters, blacks could hope for little from that avid exponent of fin-de-siecle racialism.
146. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
147. 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (Harlan & Day, JJ., dissenting).
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